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Summary 
Maintaining the Common Travel Area that has existed between the UK, Ireland, the Channel 
Islands, and the Isle of Man has been set down by the UK Prime Minister as one of her 
government’s 12 key negotiating objectives. In this note, some of the functions of the CTA are 
described, and the possible threats to it from Brexit are explored. It is concluded that the flexibility 
and informality of the CTA means that while maintaining it in name is relatively easy, changes to 
its substance are likely. Close scruntiny of any changes to the reciprocal nature and substantive 
provisions of the CTA are therefore essential to assessing the success of this aspect of the UK 
government’s negotiations. 
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Introduction 
Prime Minister Theresa May, in setting out her 12-point 
plan for exiting the EU, included the maintenance of the 
Common Travel Area as one of her top priorities.1 She, 
and UK Government ministers, have also repeatedly 
maintained that there will be ‘no “hard” border with 
Ireland’2 and that there will be no ‘return to the borders 
of the past’.3 
There is no appetite for the return of the fortified border 
posts which were so emblematic of the Troubles. 
However, in choosing their words carefully, ministers 
have sought to reassure the Northern Irish public on the 
most extreme outcome (the hard border) while 
neglecting to address the other possible day-to-day 
impacts which Brexit will have on the island of Ireland. 
Changes to the border do not necessarily mean the 
installation of guard towers and razor wire; it can be 
characterised by the imposition of administrative 
processes which curtail trade in goods and services, or investment flows, or which make cross-
border travel more difficult for people.  
 
What is the ‘Common Travel Area’ and Why is it Important? 
The Common Travel Area (CTA) is an arrangement that allows easy travel and other benefits 
between the UK, Ireland, the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man. The openness of travel between 
the UK and Ireland dates from 1922 when the Free State decided to enforce the same travel 
restrictions as the UK. Neither country required passports for travel from the other. Following the 
Second World War, the UK’s 1949 Ireland Act formalised the special relationship by declaring that 
Ireland, while no longer a dominion of the UK, is not a “foreign country”.4  
In 1952, the CTA came into being. The travel area – in addition to the small island nations off the 
UK coast – covers the two states of Ireland and the UK. Rather than being an international treaty 
or concrete agreement, the CTA exists as a collection of legal provisions in each of the relevant 
																																								 																				
1	Theresa	May,	‘The	government's	negotiating	objectives	for	exiting	the	EU:	PM	speech’	(17	January	2017)	
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-governments-negotiating-objectives-for-exiting-the-eu-pm-speech	
2	David	Davis,	‘We	don’t	want	hard	border	post	Brexit,	Northern	Ireland	still	open	for	business’	Belfast	Telegraph	(1	
Sep	2016).	
3	‘Theresa	May	on	NI	post-Brexit:	“No-one	wants	return	to	borders	of	the	past”	BBC	News	(25	Jul	2016).	
4	See	Ireland	Act	1949,	s.2.	
“We cannot forget that, as we leave, the 
United Kingdom will share a land border 
with the EU, and maintaining that Common 
Travel Area with the Republic of Ireland will 
be an important priority for the UK in the 
talks ahead. There has been a Common 
Travel Area between the UK and the 
Republic of Ireland for many years. 
 
Indeed, it was formed before either of our 2 
countries were members of the European 
Union. And the family ties and bonds of 
affection that unite our 2 countries mean 
that there will always be a special 
relationship between us. 
 
So we will work to deliver a practical solution 
that allows the maintenance of the Common 
Travel Area with the Republic, while 
protecting the integrity of the United 
Kingdom’s immigration system. 
Nobody wants to return to the borders of the 
past, so we will make it a priority to deliver a 
practical solution as soon as we can.” 
PM	Theresa	May	(17	Jan	2017)	
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jurisdictions. These legal provisions enable UK and Irish nationals to be treated almost identically 
within both states. 
The relative flexibility and informality of the CTA means that it is vulnerable to seemingly technical 
modifications that might go unnoticed. The UK withdrawal from the EU means that these 
arrangements now require negotiation. While much will depend on that nature of post Brexit 
negotiations between the UK and the EU (rather than with Ireland particularly) there is virtually 
no possibility that the border and the movement of goods, services and individuals will remain as 
they currently operate. This is particularly true if the UK leaves both the single market and the 
customs union. 
The coverage of the CTA is relatively complex and far reaching. For example, UK citizens in Ireland 
and Irish citizens in the UK have the right to vote in local, national and European elections. Both 
sets of citizens enjoy unfettered access to employment, social welfare and healthcare. The few 
exceptions to this equal treatment are political in nature: though Irish citizens can run for the UK 
Parliament, UK citizens cannot be elected to the Dáil, nor can they vote in constitutional referenda 
or Presidential elections. 
From the UK’s 
perspective, keeping the 
CTA after Brexit would 
provide a significant 
backdoor to an EU 
member state. More 
importantly, it would 
preserve the cross-border 
freedoms that many in 
Northern Ireland see as 
central to their livelihood, 
lifestyle, identity, and 
political outlook. The 
openness of the border is 
often seen as one of the 
contributing factors to, 
and benefits of, the 
current period of stability 
and peace.  
Yet, some in the UK 
would have accept that 
keeping the CTA comes with compromise to their desire to completely control migration flows to 
the UK. The continuation of the CTA would enable EU nationals, all of whom have a right to reside 
in Ireland, to become Irish citizens and gain legal access to the UK. This would not be a large 
number, but may be symbolic and become viewed as the last EU-related migration loophole that 
The	Common	Travel	Area	in	a	Nutshell	
What	does	it	affect?	 Who	are	the	
biggest	
winners?	
Will	the	benefits	continue	after	
leaving	the	single	market?	
Travel	 Border	
Communities;	
Tourists	
Equivalence	between	UK	and	
Ireland	likely	to	end.	Result	likely	
to	be	more	generous	terms	for	
Irish	citizens	than	UK	citizens.	
Work	 Businesses	in	
NI	and	Ireland;	
Border	
Communities	
Possibly,	but	with	greater	
regulation	and	bureaucracy	
(especially	entering	into	Ireland).	
Registration	systems	and	spot-
checks	likely.	
Social	Security	and	
Healthcare	
People	moving	
home	
between	UK-
Ireland	
UK	likely	to	continue	(but	with	
tighter	checks);	Ireland	may	not	be	
permitted	by	EU	law	to	continue	
the	practice.	
Voting	 Irish	in	the	UK,	
and	UK	
citizens	in	
Ireland	
UK	likely	to	continue;	Ireland	may	
not	be	permitted	by	EU	law	to	
continue	the	practice.	
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needs to be closed. This starting position could be further complicated by the introduction of UK 
identity cards, and the likelihood of EU controls upon UK citizens wishing to travel into Ireland. 
Further, the UK might also be subject to what would become illegal migration across the border. 
Put simply; any EU citizen will remain entitled to travel to Ireland. Once there, with the CTA in 
place and loose checks at the border, it will be relatively easy for EU citizens to travel across the 
border into Northern Ireland. The UK is likely to impose checks at official ports and airports to stop 
onward travel to the UK mainland. Yet this would leave Northern Ireland with the difficulties of 
policing and regulating an increased population of illegal migrants. Reports of bilateral 
negotiations suggest that the UK Government is not concerned about the prospect that the CTA 
will allow EU nationals to cross the Ireland-Northern Ireland border without specific checks being 
conducted because onward travel into the remainder of the UK can be controlled at ports and 
airports. This approach seems to presuppose that Northern Ireland is, and will remain, 
unattractive to what would become illegal migration by non-Irish EU citizens.5  
With an open border, Northern Ireland is already subject to whatever immigration and visa policies 
are enacted by the Irish government. However the reciprocity of the CTA has allowed the UK 
government to exert a degree of influence and control. In terms of non-EU citizens, Ireland and 
the UK currently maintain common travel visas for Indian and Chinese travellers and proposals 
were on the table to extend these joint arrangements to travellers from other countries prior to 
Brexit.6 Bilateral harmonisation of Irish and UK visa arrangements for other non-EU countries 
might appear to offer a means of closing the “backdoor” to the UK and Northern Ireland without 
the need for intrusive measures at the land border, but issues remain. First, such arrangements 
depend upon strong bilateral cooperation between Ireland and the UK. Far from the UK “taking 
back control” with regard to its borders, an important element of its policy will rely upon the 
practices of another state. Second, Ireland as an EU state does not control its own visa 
arrangements with regard to many non-EU countries. Where EU-third country visa waiver 
schemes are in place, the UK will have to agree to stay in line with EU policy if it is to make an 
arrangement with Ireland work. 
UK withdrawal from the EU raises two sets of critical issues. It will change how the border operates 
and will affect the lives of both UK and Irish citizens living in each other’s jurisdictions. 
 
How can the EU and Brexit affect the CTA? 
The CTA is not, at this time, problematic from the perspective of the EU. This is primarily because 
most of the important rights available to UK and Irish nationals under the CTA are duplicated in 
EU free movement/citizenship law.  There are minor differences, but on points where there is no 
EU legislative competence – such as voting in national parliamentary elections.  However, as will 
																																								 																				
5	This	route	to	the	UK	relies	on	gaining	access	to	Ireland	first.	It	is	therefore	unlikely	that	the	sort	of	Calais	migration	
crisis	would	be	repeated	in	Larne	or	Belfast,	as	undocumented	migrants	and	those	without	the	right	to	travel	to	
Ireland	would	have	to	overcome	checks	at	Irish	ports	and	airports.	
6	See	P.	Hosford,	‘It’s	going	to	be	easier	for	tourists	to	come	to	Ireland	and	the	UK	from	today’	Journal.ie	(6	Oct	2014).		
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be shown below, the overlap of rights that makes the CTA unproblematic under EU law falls away 
when the UK ceases to be an EU member state. 
 
Duplication 
The CTA and the EU treaties both provide a range of similar rights for UK and Irish citizens. For 
instance, welfare rights stemming from the CTA are virtually identical to those that any EU citizen 
possesses. Indeed, the UK’s welfare setup is focused on the CTA: several UK welfare rights require 
prior residency in the CTA. This effectively means that 
those living in Ireland can move to the UK and access 
social security benefits as if they had been resident in 
the UK. While all EU nationals living within the CTA for 
a specific period can access these benefits, the rule was 
clearly established to benefit Irish and UK nationals 
moving between the two countries.  
While much of the ‘special relationship’ has simply been part and parcel of being an EU Member 
State, the CTA has remained an important background influence. This is why both Ireland and the 
UK opted out of the Schengen agreement. Opting out was quite remarkable, as the agreement 
encompasses all other EU members as well as some non-EU states such as Norway, Switzerland, 
Iceland and Lichtenstein.  The UK did not wish to join, and by all accounts, Ireland subsequently 
declined joining so as to preserve its ‘special relationship’ with the UK.7 
Had Ireland joined Schengen then, and if it now decides to do so, the CTA would face substantial 
threats. If Ireland is in Schengen it’s connection to the rest of the EU becomes stronger and there 
are fewer checks and barriers between Ireland and the continental EU. Where there are reduced 
checks on entry into Ireland, there will be increased checks at the Irish border. 
If Ireland does not join Schengen, the CTA might survive. However, unless the UK chooses to 
remain within the European Economic Area (EEA) or another form of customs union, access to the 
common market would still have to be regulated and restricted. This would mean some form of 
checks about what and who is flowing between Ireland (and the common market) and the UK. If 
Ireland is outside Schengen, there would continue to be some checks on entry to Ireland, and 
therefore checks at the Northern Ireland-Ireland border might be somewhat less onerous. 
If the UK fully withdraws from the EU as now seems likely, Ireland faces difficult choices. Whether 
or not Ireland chooses to join Schengen, and there maybe pressure on it to do so, the EU (and not 
Ireland) would determine how the Ireland-UK border would operate. The EU will have significant 
control in determining how UK nationals gain access to Ireland, whether as visitors or residents. 
This is because the border between Ireland and 
Northern Ireland would become the EU’s external 
border and thus the EU and its member states would 
																																								 																				
7	See	B.	Ryan,	ILPA	EU	Referendum	Position	Papers	8:	The	implications	of	UK	withdrawal	for	immigration	policy	and	
nationality	law:	Irish	Aspects	(18	May	2016).	
“But	I	want	to	be	clear.	What	I	am	proposing	
cannot	mean	membership	of	the	single	
market.”	
PM	Theresa	May	(17	Jan	2017)	
	
The more controls that are imposed by the 
EU, the weaker the CTA will become. It is 
possible, especially if Ireland remains 
outside of Schengen, that it will continue in 
name. But the reciprocity and current 
substance of the CTA will have to be 
modified when the UK leaves the single 
market.	
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have an interest in controlling the movement of goods and services. Indeed, the implementation 
of such controls would be a necessity in order for the EU common market to function. Ireland 
would have little ability to resist such controls as they are so central to the EU’s purpose. 
 
Separation 
At present the EU Treaties make allowance for the operation of the CTA.8 But the factors that 
make operating a CTA between Ireland and the UK unproblematic at present are going to be 
substantially altered by Brexit.  Primarily, the CTA will cover territories of which one is within the 
EU, and the other is fully external to the EU.9  There is no significant precedent governing this type 
of situation in the EU’s history; the closest comparator is the Faroe Islands, when it did not join the 
Schengen area, but the remainder of the Nordic Passport Union did.  However, the relationship 
between the UK and Ireland is not going to replicate this, not least of all because neither country 
is in Schengen, and the traffic that crosses the land border is substantially greater. 
The main tenet of the CTA is that UK nationals in Ireland are treated as equivalent to Irish nationals 
in Ireland in almost all respects, and vice versa.  What this means, post Brexit, is that without any 
changes to the CTA, non-EU nationals (ie UK citizens) are being granted EU-level rights (and 
indeed further rights, in those areas where the CTA expands on EU citizenship rights) in an EU 
member state.  There is simply no precedent for this.  It is hard to imagine that this will sit 
comfortably with the notion that EU citizenship is the ‘fundamental status’ of all EU nationals – 
there is little ‘fundamental’ about a status that can then also be granted to nationals of a third 
country.  Indeed, while the EU has no automatic competence over third country migration policy 
in the Member States who are not party to Schengen, and thus technically does not currently fully 
determine Ireland’s third country immigration policy, there is no EU Member State that offers 
nationals from outside of the EU a better status in an EU Member State than EU nationals have.10  
It is not in principle prohibited by the EU treaties, but that is a world away from suggesting that 
there will be political acceptance of this kind of relationship among the other 26 EU Member 
States. 
The UK domestic situation is simpler: when it ceases to be an EU Member State, it is perfectly 
entitled to offer preferential treatment to Irish nationals.  However, it is hard to imagine that there 
is willingness to do this unless such preferential treatment is reciprocal.  Consequently, the future 
of the CTA is more dependent on willingness on the part of the other EU Member States to permit 
ongoing exceptional treatment than it is on the part of the UK and Ireland to not change it. 
What does the UK government intend to do? 
It has repeatedly been said by UK ministers that there is no intention to create a ‘hard’ border 
across the island of Ireland. Yet, this phrase obfuscates the range of possible outcomes for the 
border. Similarly, Prime Minister Theresa May has said that one of her 12 negotiating objectives is 
																																								 																				
8	Treaty	on	the	Functioning	of	the	European	Union,	Protocol	20.	
9	Theresa	May,	‘The	government's	negotiating	objectives	for	exiting	the	EU:	PM	speech’	(17	January	2017)	
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-governments-negotiating-objectives-for-exiting-the-eu-pm-speech	
10	See	C-55/00	Gottardo	v	Istituto	Nazionale	della	Previdenza	Sociale	[2002]	ECR	I-413,	[34].	
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to maintain the CTA. However, she has given no indication whether she intends to retain it in its 
current form. 
Hard Borders 
While it is highly unlikely that a wall will be built on the border, some (and perhaps especially those 
living close to the border) might consider other types of border checks to be ‘hard’. There might 
be, for example; spot checks on people travelling across the border, restrictions upon the goods 
that can be taken across the border, duties to declare goods going across the border, the need for 
work permits, electronic monitoring of border crossings, the presence of some physical 
checkpoints. 
A combination of these measures will be required to enforce EU customs and immigration laws. 
Ireland’s commitments to the EU, which have been adopted into the Irish Constitution, would take 
precedent in domestic law over any other treaty-based trade commitment. More light-touch 
models of customs enforcement (limited spot checks and electronic filing of customs 
documentation) are practiced on EU borders with EEA countries. However, even in such a scenario 
Ireland will still have to comply with the requirements of the Union Customs Code and a more 
onerous arrangement is likely if the border is not an EU-EEA border, but a fully external border.11 
Even if a light-touch enforcement model is adopted, many of the costs with administering this 
system will be passed on to exporters, who will have to apply to the EU for authorised economic 
operator status to take advantage of such processes. 
There are no other ‘external’ EU borders that do not come with some form of physical border 
controls.  An interesting case study here is the Faroe Islands, which declined joining Schengen 
when all other members of the Nordic Passport Union did.  The consequence of this has been for 
all Nordic Passport Union countries within Schengen to adopt stringent border controls vis-à-vis 
the Faroe Islands: those from the Faroe Islands are checked when entering any other Nordic 
Passport Union states, even though those from other Nordic Passport Union states can still travel 
without controls to the Faroe Islands.  Ireland is not in Schengen at this moment – but even so, the 
Nordic Passport Union represents the closest analogy to the Common Travel Area that we have, 
and we can see there that the EU required a protection of the EU’s external border regardless of 
the ‘special relationship’ between the Faroe Islands and the other Nordic countries. A second 
example from the region is the border between Norway and Sweden, which as an EU external 
border. As part of the Nordic Passport Union and Schengen there are not immigration controls 
between the countries, nonetheless as Norway represents an EU external border Sweden 
maintains customs checks. 
Therefore, while the UK government might argue that it is seeking to avoid a hard border, there 
is no clarity about the meaning of this. There could still be a range of onerous checks and 
restrictions put in place, that many would view as ‘hard’, or at least a significant upset to the 
established operation of the border. 
Maintaining the CTA 
																																								 																				
11	See	T.	Walsh,	European	Union	Customs	Code	(Kluwer	Law	International,	2015).	
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The UK government’s ambiguity on ‘maintaining the CTA’ might allow it to claim a victory in 
words, while having faced practical defeat. As noted above, the CTA is not a fixed agreement to 
be kept or scrapped, but rather a set of shared understandings and legal provisions between the 
UK, Ireland, the Channel Islands, and the Isle of Man. Those shared understandings could well be 
hollowed out without the language of the Common Travel Area being abandoned. Indeed, given 
the Irish government’s desire for stability in Northern Ireland it is unlikely that it will signal the 
formal abandonment of the CTA, no matter how meaningless the term becomes. 
To effectively maintain the CTA, there are a number of key features that would have to remain. 
Primary amongst these is the principle of reciprocity, where the UK and Ireland would continue 
not to treat each other’s citizens as ‘aliens’.12 The benefits flowing from this would also have to be 
maintained. This means the continued ability of the Irish to travel, live, work, claim healthcare and 
social security payments, and vote in the UK (and of UK citizens to do the same in Ireland). 
 
Conclusions 
The relationship between the EU and the CTA is complex, and has always been. The EU will have 
to extend considerable leeway to Ireland and the UK’s relationship, in light of EU citizenship law, 
if it is to continue on a reciprocal basis. Now, however the contents of the CTA risk being rapidly 
unpicked and amidst the conflicting priorities of Brexit negotiations. 
As has been outlined here, claims that there will be no ‘hard’ border or that the CTA will be 
maintained, should be treated with suspicion. Neither of these are fixed concepts, and detailed 
scrutiny is needed in order to ascertain in what ways the border will harden and how much of the 
CTA will be maintained. 
If the UK leaves the EU and the single market, significant parts of the CTA will necessarily be 
dismantled and the border will become harder. If Ireland also joins Schengen, the challenges for 
maintaining the CTA will become more severe. 
If, as seems to be the case, the structure of the UK’s new relationship with Europe is fixed, then 
careful attention is needed to the mechanisms put in place at the border and the policies that are 
to be adopted in the UK and Ireland with respect to each others’ nationals. Attachment to the 
CTA, and the rejection of a ‘hard’ border are, without clear definition, unhelpful comfort blankets 
in the context of a changing relationship. 
																																								 																				
12	See	B.	Ryan,	‘The	Common	Travel	Area	between	Britain	and	Ireland’	(2001)	64	MLR	855.	
